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Abstract
Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens
in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers
the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard
global public goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. After
a reminder of the model structure and of the deﬁnition of the two game theoretical
stability notions involved – namely, core stability and internal-external stability, the
former property is shown to hold for the grand coalition in the CWS model only if re-
source transfers of a speciﬁc form between countries are introduced. It is further shown
that while the latter property holds neither for the grand coalition nor for most large
coalitions, it is nevertheless veriﬁed in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed
“potential internal stability”) for most small coalitions. The reason for this diﬀerence
is brought to light, namely the diﬀering rationale that inspires the transfers in either
case. Finally, it is shown that the stable coalitions that perform best (in terms of
carbon concentration and global welfare) always are composed of both industrialized
and developing countries. Two sensitivity analyses conﬁrm the robustness of all these
results.
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11 Introduction
The global public good character of combating the eﬀects of climate change requires vol-
untary cooperation amongst countries if any improvement upon the laissez faire business-
as-usual is sought for. Such cooperation, institutionalized in international environmental
agreements consists in joint actions decided and implemented by the signatory countries on
a voluntary basis. Negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol represents the ﬁrst legally binding agreement on
climate. As such, it is now considered as a decisive step. However it is widely acknowl-
edged that, in order to be eﬀective, post-Kyoto agreements should include more countries
and yield stronger carbon emission abatement. This twin issue (which countries and which
abatement?) constitutes one of the cornerstone of the negotiation process under the UN-
FCCC, today and also for the coming years.
Calling a “coalition” the set of countries thus joining their eﬀorts against climate change,
an abundant literature has developed over the last 15 years dealing with the issue of the
likeliness of “stable” climate coalitions. Two main theoretical stability concepts1 are com-
peting, respectively developed in either a cooperative or a non-cooperative game theoretical
framework. An early summary is reported in Tulkens (1998) and taken up again in Chander
and Tulkens (2005). Numerically, the cooperative approach was initiated in Eyckmans and
Tulkens (2003) and the non-cooperative approach in Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus (2006).
In both papers, use was made of a well-established integrated assessment model, the ClimNeg
World Simulation (henceforth CWS) model, introduced for the purpose of coalitional analysis
in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003). The present paper pursues and extends these computa-
tional enquiries. The model allows for useful policy analyses by highlighting the properties
of potential coalitions in three respects: stability, climate performance and global welfare.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, it is methodological. The use of alter-
native game theoretic stability concepts allows for crossed insights and shows how comple-
mentary they are for climate coalition analysis. Moreover, the usefulness of these theoretical
concepts is reinforced by the use of an integrated assessment model, the combination of the
two being original in the literature. Second, the paper contributes to the policy debate.
Assessing the properties of alternative climate coalitions in a concrete context with an in-
tegrated assessment model proves to be a powerful methodology for better understanding
the costs and beneﬁts each country may have when joining an agreement. This is of major
importance for policy support. By showing that some adequate transfers among countries
may stabilize some coalitions, the paper also identiﬁes wider room for negotiation.
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 presents the CWS
integrated assessment model, as well as an update of the exogenous data it makes use of.
Section 3 reminds brieﬂy the reader of the coalition stability theory. Section 4 contains the
main numerical results concerning the two alternative stability concepts as applied to the
CWS model, while Sections 5 and 6 comment on issues of homogeneity vs heterogeneity,
1One of the two concepts is often assimilated with “self enforcement” (of treaties signed by members of
stable coalitions), as suggested initially by Barret (1994) and elaborated upon in Barret (2003). Actually,
this attractive expression applies equally well to both stability concepts. There is thus no gain in using it
here.
2aggregate welfare and environmental performance of alternative coalitions in that model.
Some sensitivity analyses are presented in Section 7 and the last section summarizes our
main conclusions.
2 The ClimNeg World Simulation model (CWS)
2.1 Overview of the model
The ClimNeg World Simulation model (CWS) is an integrated assessment model of climate
change and optimal growth, adapted for coalitional analysis from Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
It encompasses economic, climatic and impact dimensions in a worldwide intertemporal set-
ting. As a Ramsey-type model, growth is driven by population growth, technological change
and capital accumulation. The time dimension is discrete, indexed by t, ﬁnite, but very
long. The world is split into six countries/regions: USA, Japan, Europe2, China, the Former
Soviet Union and the Rest of the World. Let us note N the set of countries/regions indexed
by i = 1,...,n. In each region gross output is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function
combining capital and population. Population is exogenous. Capital accumulation comes
from (endogenous) gross investment less (exogenous) scrapping. Technical progress is Hicks-
neutral. Carbon emissions stem from global output with an emission coeﬃcient which can
be reduced by national policies, e σi,t = (1 − µi,t)σi,t, where µi,t ∈ (0,1) stands for the carbon
abatement rate and σi,t is the exogenous carbon intensity of the economy. Abatement costs
are given by an increasing and convex cost function Ci(µi,t). Carbon emissions accumulate
in the atmosphere. Concentration, through a simpliﬁed carbon cycle, yields a global mean
temperature, expressed as temperature change with respect to pre-industrial level, ∆Tt. The
impacts of global warming in each region are considered through damage functions Di(∆Tt),
increasing and convex. Thus, net consumption is given by the gross output minus invest-
ment, abatement costs and damages, Zi,t = Yi,t − Ii,t − Ci(µi,t) − Di(∆Tt). The welfare of
each country is measured as the aggregate discounted net consumption. Discount rates are
exogenous and equal to 1.5% in developed countries and 3.0% in developing ones.
The model is used to determine, over the period 2000-2300, paths of investment (Iit)
and emissions (through µit) over time and, consequently, capital accumulation, consumption,
carbon concentration and temperature change, at the world and country/regions levels. This
is done according to three alternative scenarios. First, the Nash equilibrium, which is the
joint outcome of each country maximizing its utility taking the actions of the others as
given. Second, the partial agreement Nash equilibria with respect to a coalition, each of
which is the outcome of a subset of countries maximizing jointly their utility, while the
others act individually (there are as many such scenarios considered as there are coalitions).
And third, the Pareto eﬃcient scenario where all countries act jointly so as to maximize the
world welfare.
The complete set of equations, variable deﬁnitions, parameter values and initial values
are gathered in the appendix in Tables I to VI.3
2Europe is deﬁned as EU-15.
3The model runs under GAMS. All codes are available from the authors upon request.
32.2 Data set and calibration
In this paper we use an updated version of the CWS model. For two main sets of assumptions,
time has revealed strong departing evolutions from what was expected a few years ago. These
are population growth and technological progress. Table 1 displays our assumptions, previous
ones (those used in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) – ET-03 hereafter) and current ones. Some
comments are given hereafter. As far as population growth is concerned, the CWS model
in ET-03 was using population forecasts of Nordhaus and Yang (1996), which came from
the United Nations. A positive growth was expected in every region. Our update is based
on the latest publications of the United Nations, World Population to 2300 (2004) and
World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (2005). At this horizon, world population
is expected to reach 9 billion people, 1 billion less than the previous forecast. More important,
the time proﬁles of various regions become more contrasted. Europe, Japan and China face
a peak in their population between 2020 and 2030, or even before, and then experience a
decline. The population in the Former Soviet Union is expected to decrease. In the USA, the
population increase should be stronger than expected, mainly because of immigration and
fertility rates. In the Rest of the World, short-term population growth should be stronger,
but followed by a stronger slowdown. We assume that, in each country population size
converges to a steady state value in the long run.
In the CWS model technological progress encompasses two elements, the global factor
productivity and the carbon intensity of economic activity. As far as the former is concerned,
high positive trends are expected for China and the USA, while lower progress would oc-
cur in Japan, FSU and ROW. The most striking update concerns carbon intensities which
have exhibited contrasting patterns in the recent years. Our data come from the Interna-
tional Energy Agency for carbon emissions and from the World Bank for GDP4. Apparently,
stringent industrial adjustments are in place that could yield sharp decreases in carbon in-
4In fact, we use the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool of the World Resources Institute that gathers data
from the International Energy Agency and the World Bank.
4tensities. This is particularly true for China and FSU. On the contrary, recent trends in
Japan and ROW suggest lower carbon improvements than expected. No major changes have
been noticed for the EU and the USA in comparison with the former version of CWS.
This update has two main consequences for climate issues. Firstly, world emissions are
lower in the business-as-usual scenario than they were in ET-03. But, secondly, heterogene-
ity among countries is reinforced: national emission proﬁles are lower in all countries, in
particular in China, while the USA experiences higher emissions. The implication of this is
that the relative weight of the diﬀerent countries in the global issue has signiﬁcantly changed,
and so did the costs and beneﬁts of each country to participate to a given climate agreement.
As a consequence, these new economic patterns may have major implications on a country’s
attitude towards climate negotiations, towards the coalitions they might form and on the
room for agreement5.
The analysis of climate coalition formation is based on theoretical concepts from coalition
theory. These are brieﬂy recalled in the following section.
3 A bird’s eye view of coalition theory
The CWS model has been used to study coalition formation in two diﬀerent ways. On the
one hand, ET-03 adopt a cooperative game theoretic approach with the (gamma) core as
stability concept. On the other hand, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus (2006) (CEF-06 in the
sequel) use a non-cooperative coalition formation approach with the concepts of internal and
external stability. When coalitions are found not to be stable in one or the other sense, both
approaches suggest introducing transfers to induce stability in the desired sense.
Let us describe more precisely the games under consideration. As suggested, two cat-
egories of games are associated with the CWS economic model, namely cooperative and
non-cooperative. In either one the players are the countries/regions, each player’s strategies
are the values chosen for its economic decision variables over the whole period – namely
abatement and investment – and the payoﬀs are the countries’/regions’ welfare level at the
end of the computation period. A family of n such strategies, one for each player, deﬁnes
what we have called in Section 2.1 above a scenario: among the many conceivable ones we
mentioned the Nash equilibrium scenario, the various scenarios of partial agreement Nash
equilibrium with respect to a given coalition, and the Pareto eﬃcient scenario.
While non-cooperative games deal essentially with strategies enacted by individual play-
ers (leading to, for instance, the Nash equilibrium concept), cooperative games typically
consider in addition the strategies chosen jointly by groups of players, usually called coali-
tions, that is, subsets of players (including singletons and the all players set). In either case
the behavioral assumption is made that the chosen strategy (by each individual player) or
joint strategies (in the case of coalitions) result from payoﬀ maximization over some feasible
set: the individual payoﬀs in the non-cooperative setting, the joint payoﬀs of the coalition
members in the cooperative setting, this joint payoﬀ being called the worth of the coalition.
5A complete description of the update is provided in Gerard (2006, 2007).
53.1 Stability concepts
3.1.1 The “gamma” core stability concept
When the game is considered as a cooperative one, the approach focuses ﬁrst on strategies
chosen jointly by the members of the grand coalition, that is, the set N of all countries.
Applying this to the CWS model, the behavioral assumption just mentioned implies that
N chooses the Pareto eﬃcient scenario6, that is, the values of the variables that solve the
dynamic optimization problem, stated in Table I in the appendix, for the case where the
objective function is taken as the sum over all players of expression (A.1).
This scenario and the grand coalition that generates it, are then said to be stable in the
core sense if they belong to the core of the cooperative game, that is, if the scenario is such
that (i) no individual player can reach a higher payoﬀ by not adopting the strategy assigned
to him in the eﬃcient scenario and choosing instead the best individual strategy he could
ﬁnd; and (ii) no subset of players, smaller than N, can similarly do better for its members,
that is, by rejecting the strategies assigned to them by the eﬃcient scenario and adopting a
strategy of their own.
Formally, let i refers to players (i = 1,...,n), S ⊂ N denotes a coalition, the scalar
W(S) be the worth of coalition S and the vector W = (W1,...,Wi,...,Wn) denotes an
imputation7. The imputation W will be said to belong to the core if the individual payoﬀs
Wi satisfy the following two properties:
• Property IR: Individual rationality ∀i ∈ N, Wi ≥ W({i})
• Property CR: Coalitional rationality ∀S ⊂ N,
P
i∈S Wi ≥ W(S)
To be complete, the formal statement of these two properties should further specify
what are the players’ strategies implicit in the right hand sides of these expressions, namely
W({i}) and W(S). In the former, the strategy and the ensuing payoﬀ of player i are the
ones of the Nash equilibrium scenario; in the latter, the worth of coalition S is the sum of the
payoﬀs obtained by the members of S as they result from enacting the joint strategy that
maximizes this sum; this is the scenario dubbed above partial agreement Nash equilibrium
(PANE) with respect to a coalition8. In terms of the CWS model, a PANE scenario with
respect to some S is obtained by computing a Nash equilibrium of the model (1)-(11) for
the special case where the members of S are treated as if they were a single player (whose
payoﬀ function is equal to the sum of the individual payoﬀs, actually, the worth of S) and
the remaining players are treated as singletons.
6N is the only coalition able to do that, as will be clear in the sequel.
7An imputation is any vector of individual payoﬀs W such that their sum is equal to the worth of the
grand coalition, formally:
P
i∈N Wi = W(N).
8In a partial agreement Nash equilibrium with respect to a coalition, the coalition members are assumed,
as usual, to maximize their joint payoﬀs, but it is assumed in addition – and this is not usual – that the
players outside of the coalition choose, as singletons, the strategy that maximizes their individual payoﬀ,
given the coalition and the other singletons. The equilibrium concept derived from this assumption (called
the “gamma” assumption) was introduced in Chander and Tulkens 1995 & 1997 as the essential building
block of the “gamma core” concept they proposed, to be used hereafter. A powerful further justiﬁcation of
the assumption is provided in Chander 2003.
63.1.2 The internal-external stability concept
Rather than focusing on strategies of the grand coalition, the non cooperative approach
starts from any coalition S and the payoﬀs of its members at the corresponding PANE
scenario9. It then considers the strategies and the resulting individual payoﬀs that can be
reached by every player along that scenario according to whether he is inside or outside of the
coalition10. Being inside means for the player to follow the strategy he is assigned to within
the coalition he is a member of, whereas being outside means behaving as a singleton, taking
as given the behavior of the coalition he is not a member of as well as of the other players
(assumed to behave as singletons too). A coalition and the PANE scenario it generates are
then said to be stable in the internal-external sense if no insider prefers to stay out of the
coalition and no outsider prefers to join the coalition rather than stay aside.
Formally, if Wi(S) is the individual payoﬀ of player i when coalition S is formed, this
means that the payoﬀs satisfy the following two properties:11
• Property IS: Internal Stability ∀i ∈ S, Wi(S) ≥ Wi(S\{i})
• Property ES: External Stability ∀i / ∈ S, Wi(S) ≥ Wi(S ∪ {i})
3.2 Transfer schemes
It has often been suggested that when a coalition and its strategies are not stable, transfers
of resources between countries may induce stability. How does this property of transfers
apply to the two forms of stability just deﬁned?
Following the cooperative approach ET-03 have used generalized GTT transfers to sta-
bilize the grand coalition12. Let W Nash
i be the payoﬀ of player i at the Nash equilibrium of
the non-cooperative game or equivalently, in the economic terms of the CWS model, the dis-
counted total consumption of the region in the last period of the Nash equilibrium scenario,
that is, in absence of cooperation; and let
W
∗(N) = (W
∗
1,...,W
∗
n),
be the vector of the similarly discounted total consumptions of the regions at the end of the
Pareto eﬃcient scenario. Generalized GTT transfers consist of the following amounts of the
consumption good (positive if received, negative if paid by i):
Ψi = −(W
∗
i − W
Nash
i ) + πi(
X
j∈N
W
∗
j −
X
j∈N
W
Nash
j ) i = 1,...,n, (1)
9Thus, the gamma assumption is used here too.
10It is assumed that a player can only either join the coalition or remain alone.
11The internal-external stability concept originates in the work of d’Aspremont et al. (1983) on the stability
of cartels and has been imported in the literature on IEAs by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett
(1994). The way it is presented here – in particular the connection with the PANE concept – owes much
Eyckmans and Finus (2004).
12GTT transfers are those formulated in Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) where the authors prove
analytically that these transfers make global cooperation to be in the core of a dynamic environmental game
with linear damage functions. These transfers extend to dynamics those formulated for the static case in
Chander and Tulkens (1995-1997).
7with πi ≥ 0 ∀i such that
P
i πi = 1.
The transfer formula guarantees that each region receives at least its consumption level in
case of no cooperation and divides the surplus of cooperation over non cooperation according
to weights πi. Each weight is equal to the ratio of region i’s discounted marginal damage
cost over the sum over all countries of such discounted marginal damage costs. The payoﬀ
vector
W ∗(N) + ΨN =def (W ∗
1 + Ψ1,...,W ∗
n + Ψn),
is shown13 by ET-03 to belong to the core of the cooperative game associated with the CWS
economic model.
The non-cooperative approach proposes no speciﬁc transfer formula but introduces in-
stead the notion of potentially internally stable coalitions. A coalition (of any size) is poten-
tially internally stable if it can guarantee to all its members at least their free-rider payoﬀ.
For a given a coalition, the free-rider payoﬀ of any of its members is the payoﬀ the member
would obtain in the PANE scenario w.r.t. that coalition if he would stay out and behave as
a singleton.
Formally, for any coalition S, this reads as follows:
Property PIS: Potential Internal Stability W(S) ≥
X
i∈S
Wi(S\{i}) (2)
The free rider payoﬀ of a player i – that is, each term of the sum in the right hand side
of (2) – may be regarded as the threat that the player can exert if he is a member of the
coalition. Coalitions whose worth under their PANE is large enough to overcome this threat
for all their members can thus be stabilized at least internally14.
The two approaches rest on diﬀerent views when applied to international environmental
agreements. The cooperative approach implicitly assumes that, if one or several countries
attempt to free-ride on an eﬃcient agreement with transfers, the other countries do not
cooperate among themselves anymore, so as to make the free rider see that she is better
oﬀ by not free riding. The non-cooperative approach assumes instead that if a country
attempts to free-ride on an agreement within a coalition she is a member of, this does not
prevent the other countries from cooperating among themselves and even oﬀering the free
rider compensation for not doing so.
4 Stability of coalitions in the CWS model
We now apply the above concepts to the numerical CWS model, in both its original (CWS
1.1) and updated (CWS 1.2) versions. Given the six regions, 63 coalitions can possibly form,
for each of which we compute its worth WS in the sense of the gamma-characteristic function,
that is, at a partial agreement Nash equilibrium of the model. This is done according to
formula (25)-(26) in ET-03.
13That W∗(N) + ΨN is an imputation follows from the fact that (1) implies
P
i∈N Ψi = 0.
14By using the Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme introduced in Eyckmans and Finus (2004). “Sharing scheme”
indicates that Eyckmans and Finus (2004) do not propose a particular solution but a class of sharing rules
that stabilizes all PIS coalitions.
84.1 Core stability
Let us focus ﬁrst on the results for the cooperative approach as they appear in Tables
2 and 3. In either table, the ﬁrst column contains a six digit key specifying the struc-
ture of the coalition: if a region is a member of the coalition, it obtains a “1” at the
appropriate position in the key. For instance, the key “111111” refers to S = N =
{USA,JPN,EU,CHN,FSU,ROW}. Column 2 contains the worth of a coalition (that
is the aggregate welfare of its members, W(S)) at its corresponding partial agreement Nash
equilibrium and column 3 contains the total of what members of each coalition get at the
eﬃcient allocation, as achieved by the grand coalition without transfers (W ∗
S =
P
i∈S W ∗
i ).
Column 4 gives the diﬀerence between the values of the two previous columns. If this dif-
ference is negative, it means that S is worse oﬀ in the grand coalition. Column 6 gives the
total amount of generalized GTT transfers for the coalition S (ΨS =
P
i∈S Ψi).
Comparing the two tables reveals that:
• (i) Without transfers, the world eﬃcient allocation, which needs the grand coalition to
be achieved, is not core-stable: 14 smaller coalitions (out of 63) can improve upon it
in CWS 1.1 and 18 coalitions can do so in the updated version. Thus, in either case,
the grand coalition without transfers cannot form. Note that among the 18 blocking
coalitions in the update, 14 are all those that were blocking in CWS 1.1.
• (ii) With transfers, the world eﬃcient allocation is core-stable in either case. In CWS
1.2, the amount of the transfers is in general smaller except for the USA. This last
result is in line with the two main consequences of the update as presented before: less
emissions in every region (the extent of the externality is reduced) except in the USA.
Result (ii) is especially important, as it conﬁrms with two versions of the CWS model
the possibility of achieving core stability of the world eﬃcient allocation, thanks to GTT
transfers. The concept thus appears as robust to updating. The presence of four newly
blocking coalitions may be seen as revealing an increased instability of the eﬃcient allocation
without transfers. But this makes the transfers all the more necessary if eﬃciency is being
sought in the international agreement.
4.2 Internal-external stability
Table 4 presents the results for the non-cooperative approach. The columns refer, for the
various coalitions, to the three diﬀerent stability properties (internal (IS), external (ES),
and potential internal(PIS)) proposed by this approach. A cross in a column means that the
property is satisﬁed for the corresponding coalition. We summarize the results as follows,
distinguishing again between without and with transfers cases:
• Internal and external stability: In both CWS 1.1 and CWS 1.2, very few coalitions
pass the IS test (8 or 7 of them, out of 5715). In particular, the grand coalition, that
is, the one that would achieve the world eﬃcient allocation without transfers, does not
15Here we exclude singletons.
91011pass it. More coalitions (11, or 15, out of 56 – the grand collation is irrelevant here)
pass the ES test. No coalition passes both tests however, except for one, namely the
couple USA, EU which does so only in CWS 1.2.
• Potential internal stability: Contrary to the IS and ES tests, the PIS test is one that
implicitly refers to transfers within the coalitions, with the purpose of inducing internal
stability. Here again, the grand coalition does not pass the test, but many smaller
coalitions do in both CWS 1.1 and 1.2. More precisely, all of the ﬁve-country coalitions,
5 out of the 15 four-country coalitions and 2 out of the three-country coalitions did not
pass the test in CWS 1.1. In the update, 4 ﬁve-country coalitions and 5 four-country
coalitions do not pass the test whereas 1 ﬁve-country and all other coalitions of four
countries or less do pass it, as revealed by Table 6.
4.3 Core and internal-external stability compared
Thus, without transfers, the world eﬃcient allocation, that only the grand coalition, N,
can achieve, is lacking stability in both the core sense and the internal-external sense when
computed with the CWS model.
By contrast, if transfers are introduced, the world eﬃcient allocation achieved by N can
be stabilized in the core sense, by means of GTT transfers within the grand coalition. This
is not possible in the internal-external sense, however, by means of PIS transfers.
The reason for this diﬀerence is in the logic that lies behind the two stability concepts:
in the core case, stability of N is obtained from threatening the objecting parties to be
deprived of any part in the surplus generated by the collective move to eﬃciency. In the
internal-external stability case, stability should result from oﬀering each country its free rider
payoﬀ; but it occurs that the surplus generated by the move to eﬃciency is insuﬃcient for
ensuring that to all countries. This is due to the structure of the economic model, not to
the internal-external stability concept itself.
As to the stability of coalitions other than N, none of them can evidently be stable in
the core sense because it is precisely the meaning of the core result that N with transfers
can improve upon any of them. Concerning their stability in the internal-external stability
sense, one ﬁnds in Tables 2 (or 3) and 4 hardly any correlation between those coalitions that
meet either internal or external stability (coalitions with an ’x’ in the IS or ES columns
of Table 4) and those which could block in the core sense the eﬃcient allocation without
transfers (coalitions with a negative sign in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3). In short, this is
because the reasons for blocking (which are, for the members of S, the hope to do better by
themselves) are fundamentally diﬀerent from those for free riding (which are the search for
beneﬁt from the others’ actions). This last argument also explains that the PIS property
prevails better with small coalitions: vis-` a-vis a small coalition, there is little to free ride
about (because the coalition does not achieve much), so that the surplus generated can be
suﬃcient to deter from such behavior.
In summary, the core vs internal-external stability concepts have quite opposing proper-
ties, not only as to the grand coalition, N, but also for smaller ones. One concept excludes
small coalitions, whereas the other concept can be found to be satisﬁed with small coalitions.
12135 Homogeneity of coalitions and stability
The regions/countries considered in the CWS model can be split into two categories:
• developed-Annex B countries (USA, EU and JPN), with high per capita emissions and
GDP,
• developing-non-Annex B countries (CHN and ROW), with low per capita emissions
and GDP, and low-cost abatement opportunities.
In the following we will talk about an heterogeneous coalition when a coalition is formed by
countries coming from more than a single category. Conversely, an homogeneous coalition
will designate a coalition formed by countries from a single category. The FSU will move as a
free electron in this categorization as it oﬀers the characteristics of both a developed country
(high emissions per capita) and a developing one (low cost abatement opportunities, low
GDP per capita). Accordingly, our 57 coalitions (excluding singletons) are broken down into
42 heterogeneous coalitions and 15 homogeneous ones. We examine the relation mentioned
above, successively without and with transfers
In the no transfer case, there appears to be more homogeneous stable coalitions after the
update and less heterogeneous stable coalitions. Indeed on the one hand, in CWS 1.1 only 2
out of the 8 internally stable coalitions are homogeneous coalitions. With CWS 1.2, all the 4
homogeneous coalitions involving FSU and developing-non-Annex B countries pass now the
IS test and the coalition {USA, EU} becomes both internally and externally stable.
On the other hand, in CWS 1.1, 6 of the 8 internally stable coalitions were heterogeneous
coalitions(out of 42). With the update, two of these 6 heterogeneous coalitions still pass
the IS test but those coalitions include only JPN as developed-Annex B country, which is
the least important emitter of the six regions in both versions16. Moreover, in CWS 1.1, 4
coalitions involving at least one of the two main polluters in each category , that is, (USA or
EU) and (CHN or ROW) passed the IS test. With the update, none of these coalitions passes
this test anymore17. So, less heterogeneous coalitions are stable in the IS-ES sense after the
update. In the same vein, ﬁnally, the grand coalition, clearly the largest heterogeneous one,
is never core-stable without transfers in either version, with four more blocking coalitions
after the update.
When the possibility of transfers is introduced, stability appears also to be enhanced by
homogeneity after the update. In CWS 1.1, only 1 out of the 15 homogeneous coalitions
did not pass the PIS test. That coalition, the Annex B coalition {USA, JPN, EU, FSU}18,
does satisfy the PIS property with the update. So it seems that there is more room for
cooperation between these countries today than ten years earlier. Furthermore, with the
update the Annex B coalition turns out to be more stable than the “Annex B without
16JPN is less important in terms of emissions than USA or EU and even more with the update. In CWS
1.1, JPN emission share in the emissions of its category evolves as follow: 12% in 2000, 14% in 2050 and
12% in 2200. In CSW 1.2, those ﬁgures are: 12% in 2000, 8% in 2050 and 6% in 2200.
17Moreover, in both versions, none of the coalitions that involve the two main emitters of a category and
at least one emitter of the other category is internally stable.
18The so-called Old Kyoto coalition in CEF-06.
14the USA” coalition19. Indeed, this latter coalition does not satisfy the ES property (the
property was satisﬁed with CWS 1.1). This means that the United States would be better
oﬀ by coming back to the Annex B coalition.
In CWS 1.1, 13 heterogeneous coalitions were not stable in the PIS sense. In CWS 1.2,
this ﬁgure is only 11 but the composition of these coalitions has changed to some extent.
Indeed, no four-country (or more) coalitions involving both the USA and the EU and at
least one non-Annex B countries do pass the PIS test after the update.
6 Global outcome vs stability
Can policy implications be derived from the above stability discussion and simulation re-
sults? In particular, how important are the coalitional stability properties we have identiﬁed?
Should they serve as an argument to support or advocate speciﬁc structures for climatic inter-
national agreements such as small coalitions rather than large ones, or homogeneous rather
than heterogeneous ones?
To answer these questions, let us consider two criteria measuring the global outcome
resulting from an agreement, that is,
• the aggregate welfare level reached at the world level,
• the environmental performance achieved, expressed by carbon concentrations.
and consider how these are met by alternative coalition structures. This is done in Figure
1 with the numerical results of CWS 1.2. On the two axes, we use a welfare and an envi-
ronmental index respectively, that we borrow from CEF-06. Both indexes give the value 1
to the world eﬃcient allocation (the grand coalition case) that produces the highest aggre-
gate welfare and the lowest carbon concentrations, and the value 0 to the non-cooperative
Nash case, that depicts the lowest aggregate welfare and the highest carbon concentrations.
Formally, the indexes are computed as follows:
• Welfare index: IW(S) =
P
i∈N(Wi(S)−WNash
i )
P
i∈N(W∗
i −WNash
i ) ,
• Environmental index: IE(S) =
MNash
2300 −M2300(S)
MNash
2300 −M∗
2300
,
where
P
i∈N Wi(S) and M2300(S) are respectively the aggregate welfare and carbon con-
centration levels in 2300 under the corresponding coalition structure S, while “*” refers
to the world eﬃcient allocation (full cooperation) and “Nash” refers to the Nash case (no
cooperation). An increasing relation is obtained with the non cooperative Nash equilib-
rium (lowest global welfare, highest carbon concentration) at the bottom left and the grand
coalition (highest global welfare, lowest carbon concentration) at the top right.
Remembering that internal stability in its potential form prevails with small coalitions
while core stability is achieved only with the largest one, the relation also depicts both the
welfare an the environmental performances of alternative coalition sizes.
19The so-called Present Kyoto coalition in CEF-06.
15Clearly, accepting or recommending small coalition arrangements because of their poten-
tial internal stability virtues entails a loss on both counts, that striving for an eﬃcient and
core stable alternative could avoid. Internal stability thus appears to be a weakly desirable
objective.
As to homogeneity vs heterogeneity, Figure 1 reveals that the best (in terms of global
welfare) homogeneous coalition, namely {CHN, FSU, ROW} leads to far lower global welfare
and far higher concentrations than both the best heterogeneous coalition (the grand coalition)
and the best heterogeneous coalition satisfying the PIS property, that is, {USA, JPN, CHN,
FSU, ROW}. As a consequence, promoting homogeneous coalitions would lead to very low
mitigation policies at the world level, unable to tackle climate change issue as heterogeneous
(larger) coalitions could do.
167 Sensitivity analyses
The objective of this section is to test to what extent our results are robust to the choice of
some key parameters. Extensive sensitivity analyses have revealed that two assumptions may
be key (Gerard, 2006). The ﬁrst one is the evolution of carbon intensity (σi,t in equations of
Table I) in China in the forthcoming years, and the second one is the slope of the damage
functions in all countries.
China is expected to become the world largest carbon emitter soon, but when heavily
depends on the assumption made on technological progress. In our model, carbon intensity
and total factor productivity are calibrated and projected on the basis of past proﬁles,
which yields a quite rapid – and optimistic – decarbonization of the Chinese economy in the
forthcoming decades. As a ﬁrst sensitivity analysis, we reduced the rate of decarbonization
by half, while keeping the asymptotical value unchanged. This raises Chinese emissions by
60% in the business-as-usual scenario in 2100 while the level of emissions in the very long-
term is kept unchanged. The fact that Chinese emissions are higher increases the climate
externality generated (the eﬀect of its own strategy on the other countries) and therefore the
possible gain from cooperation. However, the free-riding incentive may also be stronger for
the other countries in the coalitions including China because these coalitions will internalize
a larger part of the global externality. Both eﬀects potentially raise concern for stability.
The model shows that the gain in world welfare between the Nash equilibrium and the
eﬃcient scenarios is slightly increased by around 1%. Our main results on the core-stability of
the grand coalition and the best PIS coalition (which includes China) still prevail. The eﬀect
on the stability of coalitions without China is negative: the diﬀerence between the aggregate
welfare of the coalition and the sum of the free-riding claims of its members (deﬁnition of the
PIS property) decreases for 23 out of the 26 coalitions considered; indeed, such coalitions
internalize a smaller part of the externality. However, the eﬀect on the coalitions including
China is less clear: it increases for 16 out of 31 coalitions, but decreases for 18. In short, the
model conﬁrms the mechanisms at stake in this test and our main conclusions remain valid.
The surprise may be that the eﬀect on global welfare gain from cooperation is quite low.
The second sensitivity analysis concerns the damage functions. These, still borrowed
from Nordhaus and Yang (1996), bear major uncertainties. The relationship between global
temperature increase and climatic impacts is highly diﬃcult to quantify, and the most recent
studies (including the Stern Review and the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report) seem to
suggest higher damage sensitivity. We did this by increasing the exponent of the damage
functions (θi,2 in equations of Table I) by 50% in all countries. Intuitively, this will reinforce
the climate externality, and thus the desirability of cooperation. But, it is diﬃcult to infer,
a priori, the implication for stability because the free-riding incentive may also be stronger
when the coalitions try to better internalize the climate externality.
After computation the CWS model conﬁrms that the gain in global welfare associated
with cooperation is stronger, and this time the increase is signiﬁcant (the gain is three times
higher). However, even with such a strong incentive for cooperation, our main results on
core-stability of the grand coalition and the best PIS coalition remain valid. This means that
the stronger gain from cooperation dominates the reinforcement of the free-riding incentives.
No clear conclusion can be drawn about the impact on the stability of the other coalitions.
17Indeed, the diﬀerence between the aggregate welfare of the coalition and the sum of the
free-riding claims of its members increases for 38 out of 57 coalitions, but decreases for 19
others, making 6 coalitions no more PIS. The increase concerns mainly small coalitions, for
which we have already mentioned that there is less to free-ride about.
8 Conclusion
In the context of international climate agreements, two game theoretic approaches discuss
the stability of climate coalitions, using diﬀerent stability concepts. With the CWS model
(recently updated), this paper numerically compares and contrasts the results obtained from
either approaches. It turns out that transfers are required to ensure the stability of most
coalitions whatever the concept used. But transfers are not equally successful to stabilize
coalitions in both approaches because of the logic that lies behind the two concepts. More
precisely, if transfers can make the grand coalition stable in the gamma-core sense, it is never
the case in the internal-external sense; only smaller coalitions, where there is less to free-ride
about, are found stable in this sense, with transfers. Moreover we note that homogeneity
among the members of a coalition appears to help the potential internal stability of a coali-
tion. But the global outcome in terms of aggregate welfare or environmental performance as
reached by small or homogeneous coalitions is far less attractive compared with the hetero-
geneous world eﬃcient allocation. Thus, according to our simulations, promoting small or
homogeneous coalitions for internal stability purposes is not a desirable recommendation.
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